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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2a-
(3)(2)(h) (2004). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1: The trial court acted well within its permitted range of discretion in awarding 
Appellee primary physical custody of the children and its decision is supported by the 
evidence. 
Standard of review: This court reviews custody determinations to determine whether 
the trial court has exceeded its permitted range of discretion. See Thomas v. Thomas, 987 
P.2d 603, 606 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
2: The trial court's decision to impute income to Appellee at a graduated rate was 
within its discretion and it is supported by the evidence. 
Standard of review: A trial court's alimony decision is reviewed under the abuse of 
discretion standard. See Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 946 (Utah 1998). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no constitutional or statutory provisions that are determinative to the issues 
presented in this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
After separating from Appellant in October 2003, Appellee filed a petition for divorce 
on November 19, 2003. (R. 1-4). Appellee sought an equitable division of the marital 
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property, child support and alimony, full custody of the parties' children, and other relief. 
(R. 1-4). On May 18,2004, the trial court granted Appellee's motion for temporary orders, 
temporarily granting her full custody of the children, and ordering Appellant to, among other 
things, provide Appellee with support equal to one-half of his personal income and to 
provide medical insurance coverage for the parties' children (the "boys"). (R. 153-56). On 
March 30,2005, after reviewing both parties' pleadings and holding a hearing on the matter, 
the trial court granted Appellant's request for bifurcated divorce proceedings and ordered the 
parties' divorce decree entered nunc pro tunc as of December 31,2004. (R. 293-97). After 
permitting the parties to submit a variety of material information and evidence-including 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. 343-59; R. 378-93)-and to prepare, the 
trial court held a three-day trial in this matter. (R. 360-65). Both parties were permitted to 
introduce substantial evidence and present a variety of witnesses, including expert witnesses, 
and at the conclusion of trial, the trial court issued its memorandum decision. (R. 394-21). 
In its decision, the court adopted findings from both parties' proposed findings of fact and 
it ultimately awarded Appellee primary physical custody of both children and it ordered 
Appellant to pay both child support and alimony. (R. 415, 418). Appellant filed a flurry of 
post-trial motions attempting to alter the court's order, all to no avail. (R. 426-45; 488-94; 
498-500; 546-49). Consequently, Appellant filed this appeal on February 21,2006. (R. 577-
78). 
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BACKGROUND 
The parties were married on June 22, 1991 and during the marriage they had two 
children, Grant, born October 28, 1996, and David, born March 10, 1999 (the "boys"). (R. 
1-4; R. 10-20). In 2002, both children were diagnosed with a rare autistic disorder that 
involved both classic autism symptoms and seizures. (R. 10-20). Prior to the diagnoses 
being rendered, the parties witnessed a decline in Grant's social skills and once well-
developed physical abilities. As a result, Cheryl was forced to dedicate all of her time to her 
children, first in an effort to obtain a diagnosis, then to care for them. (R. 10-20; R. 611, pp. 
7-8) and, in an effort to provide the boys the best possible life, became intimately involved 
with their care. (R. 10-20). After thoroughly researching the issue, Cheryl determined that 
the boys required a strict modified diet and behavior regimen. She constructed a schedule 
and a diet which she established and maintained for the boys. (R. 10-20). Enforcing the 
regimen required Cheryl to dedicate countless hours working with the boys, their physicians 
and therapists, their teachers, and extracurricular facilitators. (R. 10-20). Both before and 
after the diagnosis was rendered, Cheryl was the boys' primary caregiver. (R. 10-20; R. 611, 
pp. 7-8). Due to Cheryl's tireless efforts, the boys began to respond, and the problems often 
associated with autistic disorders began to slow and even reverse. (R. 10-20). 
Prior to discovering the boys' disorders, Cheryl worked as an independent real estate 
appraiser. (R. 10-20; R. 611, pp. 53-57). From 1992 through 1999-her last year of 
substantive work in this field-Cheryl earned $36,575.00. (R. 10-20). From 1999 through 
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2002, Cheryl earned no income, due to her dedication to serving the boys' developing needs. 
(R. 10-20; R. 611, p. 8). At the time of trial, Cheryl's skills were no longer current. (R. 611, 
pp. 53-55). She had no client list and none of the tools required to perform the functions 
associated with real estate appraisal. (R. 611, pp. 52-57). Even when she obtains all of the 
necessary skills, tools, and clients, she will still have the enormous responsibility of caring 
for Grant and David and ensuring that they maintain both the diet and behavior regimen that 
appears to be positively affecting their lives. (R. 611, pp. 57-58). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Appellant, Brian Carsten ("Brian"), challenges two of the trial court's findings as 
unsupported by the evidence. He is not only incorrect, but his failure to marshal the evidence 
that supports these findings should be fatal to his appeal. Instead of marshaling, Brian has 
argued either that no evidence exists that supports the finding, or that the evidence upon 
which the trial court based its decision is not appropriate. In either case, the record is replete 
with evidence that supports the trial court's decision, and Brian's failure to marshal the 
evidence casts that duty upon both the court and Appellee, Cheryl Carsten ("Cheryl"), which 
is not permitted. Thus, Brian's arguments should be disregarded, and the trial court's order 
should be affirmed. 
To the extent that Brian did marshal the evidence, his arguments are unpersuasive. 
The trial court has enormous discretion in determining custody, and it exercised that 
discretion properly in this case. Cheryl has been the boys' primary caregiver throughout their 
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lives. She, with the assistance of the boys' doctors and therapist, carefully crafted a behavior 
and dietary regimen that appears to be controlling some of the more catastrophic aspects of 
the boys5 disorder. Moreover, Brian's conduct during the pendency of the trial, more 
specifically, his sharp accounting practices, was not performed in the boys' best interests. 
Consequently, the court's decision to grant Cheryl primary physical custody is unassailable. 
Similarly, the trial court has a good deal of discretion in its decisions involving 
alimony. Here, prior to filing for divorce, Cheryl had been unemployed for a number of 
years. Although she is willing and able to return to her occupation as a real estate appraiser, 
the court recognized that she would need time to develop both the clientele and the skills 
necessary to bring her income to an expected level. The court further recognized that Cheryl 
would be required to care for David and Grant while she was building her new business, thus, 
the court imputed income to Cheryl, but it did so on a graduating scale that would reach its 
maximum at the three-year point. In doing so, the court recognized that it would be 
inequitable to impute an income to Cheryl that she could not achieve in the near future, 
especially given her commitment to the boys. 
ARGUMENT 
L APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE 
SUPPORTING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS, THUS HIS 
ARGUMENTS SHOULD BE DISREGARDED, 
Brian has failed to disclose to this court all of the evidence that supports the trial 
court's challenged findings, and as a result, his arguments-and his brief-should be 
disregarded. 
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To successfully challenge an ultimate finding of fact, "an 
appellant must first marshal all of the evidence in support of the 
finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally 
insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in a 
light most favorable to the court below." An appellant "must 
present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of 
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very 
findings the appellant resists." Moreover, an appellant may not 
simply review the evidence presented at trial, nor may he 
"reargue the factual basis [he] presented in the trial court." 
Parduhn v. Bennett, 2004 UT 82, \ 25, 112 P.3d 495 (citations omitted). "This duty is not 
satisfied by merely making the 'pertinent excerpts from the record readily available to a 
reviewing court,'" Neely v. Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, \ 11, 51 P.3d 724 (quoting West 
Valley City v. Majestic Inv., Ca, 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), "nor by 
presenting 'in minute detail all the evidence before' the trial court." Id. (quoting Heinecke 
v. Department of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459, 464 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). Clearly, Brian's 
burden to marshal is especially "rigorous and strict," due to his assertion that the findings are 
supported by no evidence, Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, \ 79, 100 P.3d 1177, because 
accepting his position "inappropriately force[s] an appellee to marshal the evidence to refute 
an appellant's assertion of the absence of evidence." Id. at \ 78. In the face of an appellant's 
failure to properly marshal the evidence, Utah's courts of appeal generally summarily affirm 
the challenged trial court decision. See, e.g., Crookstonv. Fire Ins. Exch., 817P.2d789, 805 
(Utah 1991). 
Here, Brian argues that the trial court erred in finding that the children's best interest 
will be better served with Cheryl as the primary physical custodian, and in finding that 
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Cheryl's imputed income should be measured at a graduated rate over three years. Evidence 
supporting the best interest finding can be found in the deposition testimony of Doctor Bryan 
Jepson, a physician familiar with the children's needs,1 as well as through Cheryl's testimony 
concerning the children, their care and needs, and Brian's conduct throughout the 
proceedings that led to the order that Brian now challenges. For instance, Cheryl testified 
that she was the boys' primary caregiver and that she was responsible for their health and 
welfare throughout the day. (R. 661, pp. 7-8). Cheryl also testified that although Brian was 
well intentioned, he was unable to comply with the complicated regimen necessary for the 
boys to progress and that when the boys spent time with Brian they tended to regress toward 
symptoms related to their autistic disorder. (R. 661, pp. 14-16). Cheryl also testified that 
Brian had paid less than $13,000.00 to her since their separation, a period of nearly two 
years, and that in making such miserly payments, Brian had made it very difficult to provide 
for the boys' rather complicated needs. (R. 661, p. 68). Similarly, Cheryl testified that Brian 
had cancelled the medical insurance he had been ordered to maintain for the boys, and that 
he had consistently failed to comply with the court's instruction that the parties follow the 
advice rendered by the experts. (R. 661, pp. 21, 30, 43). Admittedly, Brian does cite to 
evidence concerning his own conduct; however he makes no effort to marshal either Cheryl's 
testimony, the testimony of Dr. Jepson, or any of the other evidence upon which the trial 
Doctor Jepson5s deposition was entered into the trial record as Exhibit #7; 
however, counsel for Appellee was unable to locate any exhibits in the record that has been 
presented to the court of appeals. (R. 661, p.46). 
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court could have based its findings, and given the court's decision, this evidence was material 
to its decision.2 Brian thus failed to marshal the evidence supporting the custody decision. 
Similarly, Brian failed to marshal the evidence concerning the trial court's finding on 
Cheryl's ability to earn income. Cheryl presented the court with information concerning her 
work history, which included her experience as a real estate appraiser over a period of about 
six years. (R. 10-20). During that period, Cheryl earned less than $40,000.00 and she never 
developed an extensive network of contacts or clients. (R. 10-20). When she began to 
suspect that Grant might be ill, Cheryl abandoned her appraisal business and from that point 
on she dedicated herself to determining what condition was afflicting her children, and then, 
upon discovering the cause, to attempting to minimize the impact that the condition would 
have on the boys' futures. (R. 661, p. 5). Due to the nature of the boys' illness, Cheryl will 
never be free to commit herself fully to any business, but if the therapy has the hoped-for 
effect, as the boys age Cheryl should have more time to commit to her appraisal business. 
(R. 661, pp. 53-57). The court was presented with all of this evidence and more, and in 
reliance upon the evidence, the court determined that imputing income to Cheryl at a 
2
 The entire case dragged on from November of 2003 through August of 2005, and 
it culminated in three days of trial, August 11, 12 & 17. During this time, the court was provided 
ample opportunity to review all of the thousands of pages of documents and pleadings that were 
submitted by the parties, and the court was exposed to the needs of the parties' children, both of 
whom suffer from autism, to varying degrees. As a result of the court's familiarity with the case, 
it found, among other things, that Cheryl was the children's primary caregiver, (R. 404), that 
Brian had not properly supported the children, (R. 406-07), and that the children would be best 
served by a consistent environment, diet, and "regimen," and that Brian was not invested in any 
program that would provide these factors, let alone the program adopted by Cheryl and urged by 
Dr. Jepson, (R. 398-403). 
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graduated rate would be the most equitable solution to determining her ability to earn. 
Brian's failure to point this court to any of this evidence, let alone all of this evidence, 
amounts to a material failure to marshal and as a result this court should summarily affirm 
the trial court's decision. 
Brian's entire argument on appeal should be disregarded due to his failure to marshal 
all of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings. In failing to marshal, Brian has 
opened the door for this court to summarily affirm the trial court's decisions, and Cheryl 
urges this court to accept Brian's invitation and affirm the trial court in toto. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WELL WITHIN ITS RANGE OF 
DISCRETION IN MAKING ITS CUSTODY DECISION. 
Contrary to Brian's assertion on appeal, the trial court was well within its discretion 
in granting Cheryl primary physical custody of the children in this case. Utah trial courts are 
afforded broad discretion "'so that [they] may use [their] first-hand proximity to the parties 
to resolve the delicate and highly personal problems presented in custody disputes.'" Thomas 
v. Thomas, 987 P.2d 603, 606 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Erwin v. Erwin, 773 P.2d 847, 
849 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). Given this discretionary authority, and clearly superior position, 
the trial court's decision will be reversed "'[o]nly where the trial court's judgment is so 
flagrantly unjust as to be an abuse of discretion.'" Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209, 1214 
(Utah 1996) (quoting Shioji v. ShiojU 712 P.2d 197, 201 (Utah 1985)). "The trial court's 
discretion stems from the reality that in some cases the court must choose one custodian from 
two excellent parents, and its proximity to the evidence places it in a more advantaged 
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position than the appellate courts." Id. "It cannot be said that a trial court has abused its 
discretion in awarding custody to one parent over another where analysis reveals that the best 
interests of the child would be served equally well with either parent." Id. at 1216. 
Similarly,"' [i]n considering competing claims to custody between fit parents under the "best 
interests of the child" standard, considerable weight should be given to which parent has 
been the child's primary caregiver.'" Thomas, 987 P.2d at 607 (citation omitted). 
Here, at a minimum, Brian seems to concede that he and Cheryl are equally capable 
of caring for the parties' children. In making this concession, Brian undermines his argument 
against the trial court's award of primary physical custody to Cheryl, and in fact apparently 
concedes that the decision cannot amount to an abuse of discretion. See id. However, even 
in the absence of Brian's concession, the trial court's decision that it was in the boys' best 
interest that Cheryl be granted primary physical custody is not subject to successful attack. 
The court, in making its decision, was supported by a host of evidence. 
Specifically, as Cheryl began her testimony, she informed the court that she 
get[s] [the boys] up in the morning, bathes[s] them, dress[es] them, 
feedfs] them, administers] their medication, take[s] them to and from 
school, participate^] in their activities and doctor appointments, go[es] 
to the bulk of the medical and therapy appointments with them, put[s] 
them to bed, read[s] to them, [and] teach[es] them 
on a daily basis. (R. 611, pp. 7-8). She further testified that Brian attended very few of the 
boys' doctor appointments and that he seems unable to comprehend the boys' dietary 
restrictions or participate in the rather detailed regimen that the boys required due to their 
condition. (R. 611, pp. 11, 14-15). Moreover, due to Brian's inability to maintain the 
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program, the boys consistently "lost ground" after visits with Brian. (R. 611, p. 16). When 
recalling Brian's conduct after the parties separated, Cheryl testified that he had "dropped" 
the boys medical insurance coverage-which the trial court had ordered him to maintain-and 
that he had paid her less than $13,000.00 in support during the almost two-year period 
between the beginning of the separation and the trial date, although he was fully aware of the 
cost of the boys' therapy and special diet. (R. 611, pp. 21, 43, 68). 
Although the trial court went to great lengths to describe its disappointment with 
Brian's conduct during the pendency of the trial, it clearly considered the boys' relationship 
with Cheryl and her status as the custodial parent. The court also had access to, and 
apparently gave great credence to, Cheryl's understanding of the boys' disorder, and her 
willingness to sacrifice in an attempt to see that the boys were provided as near a normal life 
as possible. Consequently, the court's best interest decision is well supported. See Chen, 
2004 UT 82 at f 82 ("[A]n appellee need only point to a scintilla of evidence that supports 
a court's findings in order to refute an appellant's claim of no evidence.").3 Because the 
record is replete with evidence that supports the court's best interest determination, and 
Brian's attempt to find fault with the court's discussion of Brian's conduct during 
the pendency of the divorce proceeding is ill-conceived. The court was presented with ample 
evidence that Brian took advantage of "sharp practices" to minimize his income, which reduced 
his obligation to Cheryl and the boys. Moreover, Brian's reliance on Deeben v. Deeben, 776 
P.2d 972, 974 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) is also misplaced. As evidenced by the language of the 
case, "trial courts must not reward or punish parents for their conduct during a marital 
relationship through a custody award." Id. But, the court continued, the "[t]he primary focus is 
always the best interest of the children." Id at 974. The Deeben court held that the proper focus 
should be on which party would be the better caretaker of the children, and serve their best 
interests, and that is precisely the approach taken by the court in this case. Consequently, Deeben 
is of no value to Brian's argument. 
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because Brian has failed to assert that the court erred, the court's determination should be 
affirmed. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS AUTHORITY IN 
DETERMINING APPELLEE'S INCOME DURING THE FIRST TWO 
YEARS OF THE ALIMONY AWARD. 
The trial court's decision to impute income to Cheryl at a graduated rate was well 
within its range of discretion, and in making that decision, the court accounted for a range 
of factors, including time for Cheryl to develop clients and time she needs to spend with the 
children. "Trial courts may exercise broad discretion in divorce matters so long as the 
decision is within the confines of legal precedence." Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836 P.2d 814, 
816 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). This broad discretion extends to decisions involving alimony, and 
the court of appeals "will not disturb a trial court's alimony award so long as the trial court 
exercised its discretion within the appropriate legal standards." See Childs v. Childs, 967 
P.2d 942,946 (Utah 1998). When considering alimony, trial courts are directed to consider 
four factors: "(0 the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; (ii) the recipient's 
earning capacity or ability to produce income; (iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide 
support; and (iv) the length of the marriage." Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 946 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998) {quoting Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(a)(i)-(iv) (Supp. 1998)). Brian challenges 
only the trial court's conclusion that Cheryl's imputed income should be gradually increased 
over the first three years of the alimony award. However, this court has stated "[i]f these 
factors have been considered, '"we will not disturb the trial court's alimony award unless 
such a clear inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion.'"" Id, (quoting 
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Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (additional citations omitted)). 
"Moreover, because it is sufficient to impute a lesser income to the recipient spouse so that 
she might give adequate care and nurturing to the parties' minor children," when a trial court 
does so, its decision will be upheld. Rehn v. Rehn, 1994 UT App 41, If 9, 974 P.2d 306. 
Here, the court was presented with Cheryl's testimony both in her affidavit and her 
live testimony at trial. (R. 10-20; R. 611, 6-188). Through this testimony, the court was 
presented with evidence of Cheryl's work history, which included her time as a certified real 
estate appraiser. As an appraiser, Cheryl realized less than $40,000.00 income over the 
course of six years, and during her best year, Cheryl made $12,972.00. (R. 10-20). Cheryl 
also informed the court that she had left the appraisal business in 1999, when it became 
apparent to her that she needed to devote full time attention to caring for the boys. 
Brian argues that the only evidence tendered to the trial court concerning the income 
levels for real estate appraisers was offered by Jerry Webber, Randy Millett, and by Cheryl 
herself. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 14-15. However, not only does Brian's version of the 
evidence fail to recognize certain critical elements of Cheryl's testimony, it also fails to 
mention the testimony of Mark Hedrick, a vocational expert who assessed Cheryl and Brian. 
Cheryl testified, through affidavit, that during her time as an active real estate appraiser she 
had earned less than $40,000.00, and that the highest amount she had ever grossed in a given 
yearwas less than $13,000.00. (R. 18-19). She also testified that she did not have sufficient 
funds to purchase the materials necessary to start her appraisal business (R. 611, pp. 53-55) 
and that even if she did have sufficient funds she would need time to develop the business 
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to the level that would realize the income it was estimated that she could earn through 
appraisal. (R. 611, p. 57). To this end, Cheryl provided the court with a very simple and 
broad time line of her earning potential and she tied that time line to the boys' schedule. (R. 
611, pp. 58-60). 
Mr. Hedrick testified that his estimate of the median income for real estate appraisers 
came from a variety of recognized sources, including the state of Utah. (R. 661, pp. 195-97), 
He further testified that his estimate was merely the average derived from a wide variety of 
sources. (R. 611, pp. 196-97). However, when pressed, Mr. Hedrick admitted that the 
estimate was derived from averaging, or "lumpfing] together" income information from all 
available sources, regardless of their relative skill levels, certifications, levels of experience, 
or training. (R. 611, pp. 196-97). Moreover, the income estimates also did not account for 
variations in income resulting from time in the market, or as affected by start-up costs. (Id). 
Finally, the court was presented with no testimony as to Cheryl's ability to enter the 
market, or her ability to generate income. Instead, as Brian has ably pointed out, the 
testimonies of Mr. Webber and Mr. Millett centered on their general understanding of the 
requirements of the appraising business. At no point did either witness testify that they were 
familiar with appraisers who shared Cheryl's circumstance, nor did they opine as to the 
income that they believed Cheryl herself would be capable of earning. 
Clearly, the trial court carefully considered all of the evidence presented to it. The 
court understood Cheryl's position and the amount of work she was required to perform 
merely to keep the boys from regressing. The court also recognized that Cheryl has a 
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marketable skill and that given the opportunity to ease into the market, Cheryl could excel 
and provide for both herself and the boys. The boys, due to their conditions, require a huge 
investment of Cheryl's time and energy every day, and the trial court acted well within its 
discretion in determining that Cheryl's ability to produce income would increase over time, 
thus decreasing her need for alimony on the same graduated scale. Accordingly, this court 
should affirm the trial court's graduated alimony award. 
IV. BRIAN SHOULD BE ORDERED TO PAY CHERYL'S COSTS AND 
FEES RESULTING FROM THIS APPEAL. 
Because Cheryl was awarded fees below, this court should order Brian to pay all of 
the fees and costs that she has incurred through defending this appeal. "' Generally, when the 
trial court awards fees in a domestic action to the party who substantially prevails on appeal, 
fees will be awarded to that party on appeal.'" Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018, 1027 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993) (quoting Lyngle v. Lyngle, 831 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)). Here, 
based on Cheryl's need and Brian's relative economic stability, the trial court ordered Brian 
to pay $10,000.00 of Cheryl's fees at the conclusion of the three-day trial. Cheryl has every 
expectation of prevailing on all of the issues that Brian has presented on appeal, and as a 
result, she now asks this court to enter an order directing Brian to pay all of the costs and fees 
that she has incurred as a result of Brian filing this appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 34 (noting 
that "if a judgment or order is affirmed, costs shall be taxed against appellant unless 
otherwise ordered"). Accordingly, this court should enter such an order and award Cheryl 
her costs and fees. 
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CONCLUSION 
Brian failed to marshal all of the evidence that supports findings that he challenges 
on appeal. Because he failed to marshal the evidence, Brian's arguments should be 
disregarded. To the extent that this court determines he has marshaled the evidence properly, 
that evidence supports the trial court's findings. The trial court found that awarding Cheryl 
primary physical custody was in the children's best interests, and the court supported this 
finding by referring not only to the children's need for stability, but also to Brian's failure 
to put the needs of the children before his own in making decisions concerning child support. 
Finally, the court properly imputed to Cheryl a graduating imputed income figure. The court 
found that Cheryl needed both to purchase necessary equipment and to build a book of 
business before she could maximize her income through real estate valuation. The court also 
found that because Cheryl is the primary caregiver, her ability to generate income is less than 
what might be otherwise possible. 
Accordingly, this court should reject Brian's arguments, affirm the trial court's order, 
and order Brian to pay Cheryl's costs and fees associated with this appeal. 
Accordingly, this court should affirm the trial court's decision. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \Lp day of November, 2006. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
David S. Dolowitz 
Dena C. Sarandos 
Thomas J. Burns 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellee 
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